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Rethinking the Application of ADA Precedent
to FEHA Disability Discrimination Cases
GABRIEL

N. WHITE*

INTRODUCTION

Charles Gelfo worked as a metal fitter for Lockheed Martin from
198o to 1984, when he was laid off.' He was rehired in 1997 .2 He injured

his lower back on the job in September 2000, but continued to work until
he was laid off a month later? Although not working, Gelfo remained
technically employed for Lockheed because he was on a recall list
making him automatically eligible for rehire.4 Two different doctors
examined Gelfo in connection with his worker's compensation claim.
The first, Dr. Pratley, examined Gelfo several times in the months
immediately after his injury.' In May 2001, Dr. Pratley released Gelfo to
return to work with restrictions on performing repetitive lifting of heavy
items, but Lockheed had no metal fitter positions available, and Gelfo
remained laid off. 6 Then, in June

2001,

a second doctor, Dr. Paul,

examined Gelfo and determined that he was "permanently disabled" and
should not perform "heavy work." 7 Dr. Pratley again examined Gelfo in
September 2001 and agreed that Gelfo was seriously and permanently
impaired.8 Although Dr. Pratley did not recommend any "specific work
place modifications or preclusions," he did recommend that Gelfo not do
any heavy lifting, repetitive bending, or prolonged sitting or standing.9
Because working as a metal fitter requires all of those activities, Dr.
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2008; B.A., Amherst
College, 1998. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Professor Reuel Schiller for his enthusiasm,
patience, and generosity, which he demonstrated by reading and thoughtfully commenting on multiple
drafts of this Note. This Note also benefited greatly from feedback by Katie Annand and Greg
Carlson. Special thanks to Anne Dwyer.
i. Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 874,878 (Ct. App. 2006).
2. Id.

3. Id.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. Id. at 878-79.
7. Id. at 879.

8. Id.
9. Id.
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Pratley determined that Gelfo would not be able to return to his previous
position.'" Dr. Pratley recommended Gelfo's enrollment in a vocational
rehabilitation program designed to retrain him as a plastic parts
fabricator and assembler." Gelfo completed the ten week vocational
rehabilitation program in February 2002, and upon graduation,
Lockheed offered each trainee a position as a fabricator.'2 Two days after
graduation, however, Lockheed revoked its offer to Gelfo.'3 A Lockheed
placement review committee affirmed that decision, determining through
a review of Gelfo's medical records and testimony from his workers'
compensation action that his medical restrictions rendered him unable to
perform the essential functions of a fabricator, and that no reasonable
accommodation was possible.'4
At all points during the vocational rehabilitation program and after,
Gelfo insisted that his back "felt great"; he never claimed to be actually
disabled. 5 Dr. Pratley agreed upon reexamination in February 2002 that
the work restrictions he had earlier recommended were no longer
necessary and cleared Gelfo to return to work." However, ever after
being informed that Gelfo had taken a position with another company
that required him to perform the same functions without any
accommodations, Lockheed refused to reevaluate its assessment of
Gelfo's medical condition."
After exhausting administrative remedies, Gelfo filed suit against
Lockheed on March 30, 2003, alleging violations of California's Fair
Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") and common law wrongful
termination claims." The trial court found the wrongful termination
claim was time barred. 9 The court further determined that portions of
the FEHA claims were barred because Gelfo was not actually disabled;
the court found that an employer has no duty to provide reasonable
accommodation or engage in interactive dialogue about accommodations
with an employee or applicant who is not actually disabled. 0 The only
Io. Id.
ii.
12.
13.
14.

Id.

Id. at 88o.
Id.
Id. at 88o-81.

15. Id. at 884. The court notes that "Gelfo insists that, had Lockheed discussed the matter with

him, it would have learned his restrictions-to the extent they required any accommodation at allcould easily have been accommodated by permitting him an additional break or two, or allowing him
to occasionally sit on a stool." Id. at 895 n.20.
t6. Id. at 88o.
17. ld. at 88o-8i.
i8. Id. at 881.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 881-82. Neither the ADA nor FEHA make use of the term "actually" disabled, but
following the lead of the courts that have discussed this issue, I will make use of it for the sake of
clarity. See id. at 883 n.8.
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issue submitted to the jury was the allegation that Lockheed had violated
FEHA by refusing to hire Gelfo based on its perception that he was
physically disabled." The jury returned a verdict in favor of Lockheed."2
The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the lower
court erred in its disposition of the claims that did not reach the jury, as
well as in its instructions to the jury on the remaining claims. 3 Many of
these errors followed from the lower court's determination that an
employer has no duty to provide reasonable accommodations or engage
in interactive dialogue about accommodations with an employee or
applicant who is not actually disabled. 4 The appellate court held that an
employer does have a duty "to provide a reasonable accommodation to
an applicant or employee who is not 'actually' disabled, but is 'regarded
as' having a disability."' 5 The employer also has a duty to engage in an
informal dialogue with the "regarded as" disabled applicant or employee
to determine effective reasonable accommodations. 6 Based on the
record before it, the appellate determined that Gelfo was not "actually
disabled" as a matter of law; indeed, he had never claimed to be so." It
also found as a matter of law that Lockheed had "regarded" Gelfo as
disabled. 8 There was no factual question on that issue for the jury to
decide because Lockheed had "never maintained its decision not to hire
Gelfo was premised on anything other than its belief that medical
restrictions imposed as a result of Gelfo's lower back injury rendered
him unable to perform the essential functions of a fabricator."' 9 After
determining these matters of law and articulating the proper legal
standard for employers' duties in the "regarded as" disabled context, the
appellate court remanded to the superior court for determination of the
facts relevant to Gelfo's claims of discrimination in hiring, failure to
provide reasonable accommodation, and failure to engage in the
interactive process.3"
By so holding on the issue of the employer's duty to accommodate in
the "regarded as" context, the court weighed in on an issue "novel to
California" and which so far "only federal courts [had] considered ...

Id. at 882.
Id.
23. Id. at 885-89.
24. The jury instructions, for example, were so garbled that the jury would have had to find Gelfo
to be actually disabled in order to find Lockheed liable on a "regarded as" disabled theory. Id. at 888.
Given that Gelfo insisted at all points that he was not actually disabled, it is therefore no surprise that
the jury returned a verdict in favor of Lockheed.
25. Id. at 89o-9i.
26. Id. at 895.
27. Id. at 883-85.
28. Id.at 885-86.
29. Id. at 886.
30. Id.at 897 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a), (m), (n) (West 2007)).
21.

22.
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and only under federal law."3 ' The California Supreme Court declined
review," so the matter is not finally settled under California law. For the
moment, however, the Gelfo court's holding is the law of the state. With
this ruling, California parts company with the Ninth Circuit's stance on
the analogous federal issue and takes sides in a dispute that has left the
federal courts almost evenly divided.33
In this Note, I will question the Gelfo court's method of analysis in
the course of agreeing with its result. Although the Gelfo court's holding
is mainly supported by reference to persuasive federal precedent, the
result was correct under the employment provisions of FEHA,34 no
matter how the analogous federal issue under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")3 5 might be resolved. I will argue,
however, that the Gelfo court's reliance on federal precedent is
problematic and that this same method of analysis has been a source of
serious error on the part of a number of California appellate courts
dealing with other state disability law issues. In Part I, I will review the
split of the federal circuits on the issue of reasonable accommodations in
the "regarded as" context. In Part II, I will discuss the reasoning of the
Gelfo court for taking sides as it did in this federal circuit split. In Part
III, I will discuss some of the fundamental differences in approach
between California and federal disability law. With attention to those
fundamental differences, I will return to the issue of reasonable
accommodations in the "regarded as" disabled context in Part IV.
Finally, in Part V, I will examine a recent California Supreme Court
ruling that resolved a split among the California appellate districts over
applying ADA precedent to FEHA cases in another context. This ruling
demonstrates the risk of error that comes with the Gelfo court's
approach of relying heavily on federal precedent to construe California
disability law.
Id. at 89 o .
32. Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. Si4498 4 , 2oo6 Cal. LEXIS ioo99, at *I (Cal. Aug. 23,
31.

2006).
33. The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that an employer has no duty to
provide reasonable accommodation to an applicant or employee who is only "regarded as," but not
"actually" disabled, while the First, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have come to the opposite
conclusion. Kristopher J. Ring, Disablingthe Split: Should Reasonable Accommodations Be Provided
to "Regarded As" Disabled Individuals Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct (ADA)?, 20 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 311, app. at 364-73 (2006). District courts in the Second Circuit have followed the

latter course, and the Second Circuit has affirmed those judgments in relevant part, but has not itself
reached the question. Id. at 364-65. There are no Fourth Circuit discussions or decisions on the issue,
and only one district court in the Fourth Circuit has dealt with the issue, finding no duty of
accommodation. Id. at 367. The Seventh Circuit has discussed the issue several times, but has not
reached the issue, and district courts in the Seventh Circuit are themselves split on the issue. Id. at
.
34. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12900--12996 (West 2007).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12tOt-12213 (2000).

3 68-6 9
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I. THE FEDERAL SPLIT
The ADA requires an employer to make "reasonable
accommodations" for "an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability. ' ' , 6 As a corollary, regulations enforcing the ADA require that
the employer "make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate
accommodation," noting that often "[t]he appropriate reasonable
accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process
that involves both the employer and the [applicant or employee] with a
disability."37 This interactive process is a vital part of the statutory
scheme, intended to reduce the need for courts to become involved in
adjudicating employer-employee disputes:
The focus of the interactive process centers on employee-employer
relationships so that capable employees can remain employed if their
medical problems can be accommodated, rather than on sounding a
clarion call to legal troops to opine on whether the employee's
impairment is an actual disability within the legal nuances of the
[statute].3s

Almost all the circuits to reach the issue have found that failure to
engage in the informal interactive process constitutes a violation of the
ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement, just like a more direct
refusal to provide reasonable accommodation.39
The ADA's statutory definition of "disability" has three disjunctive
prongs: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of [an individual]; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment."4' The statutory text does not explicitly distinguish between
individuals found to be disabled under one or another of the three
prongs with regard to how such individuals are to be treated by their

36. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
37. 29 C.F.R. app. pt. 1630 (2007).
38. Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d I5I, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
39. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.,228 F.3d 1105, I12 (9 th Cir. 2000) (noting that almost all of the
circuits to rule on the question have held that the interactive process is mandatory). But see GarciaAyala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 650 (Ist Cir. 2000) (holding that failure to engage in
interactive process is not a per se violation, but rather examination on a case-by-case basis is required
to determine whether failure to engage in informal interactive process constitutes a failure to provide
reasonable accommodation that amounts to a violation of the ADA); Willis v. Conopco, Inc., io8 F.3d
282, 285 (IIth Cir. I997) (holding that the plaintiff must produce evidence that a reasonable
accommodation is available before an employer is obligated to engage in the interactive process).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The regulations further define "regarded as" disabled as meaning that
an individual:
(I)[hlas a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life
activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation; (2) [h]as a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result
of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3)[hias [no physical or mental
impairment] but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.
29

C.F.R. §

1630.2(l).
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employers. Rather, on its face, the ADA requires that employers provide
"reasonable accommodations" to all "qualified individual[s] with a
disability."' 4' Even the courts that have found no duty to accommodate in
the "regarded as" context concede that the plain language of the ADA
does not differentiate between those who are disabled under either of
the first two prongs of the definition and those who are "regarded as"
disabled.42 Thus, the informal interactive process would also seem to
apply equally in the "regarded as" context; indeed, it may be even more
important in that context, as a "prophylactic means to guard against
capable employees losing their jobs even if they are not actually
disabled. ' 43 The interactive process provides employers and employees
an opportunity to discuss what might constitute reasonable
accommodation for a disability. Where the employee can disabuse the
employer of its mistaken belief that the employee is disabled, the need
for any sort of accommodation is obviated. And in the view of at least
one court, "an employer who is unable or unwilling to shed his or her
stereotypic assumptions based on a faulty or prejudiced perception of an
employee's abilities must be prepared to accommodate the artificial
limitations created by his or her own faulty perceptions."'
However, despite the lack of explicit differentiation among the
separate prongs of the ADA definition of disability, four circuits have
held that the third prong of the disability statute must be treated
differently, such that applicants or employees who are regarded as
disabled by their employers, but who are not actually disabled and do not
have a record of disability, have no right to reasonable
accommodations.45 The Fifth Circuit and Sixth Circuit refused to apply a
duty of reasonable accommodation in the "regarded as" context, but did
not offer reasoning underlying their holdings. 46 Both the Eighth Circuit
and Ninth Circuit, however, explained the reasoning behind their finding:
"the absence of a stated distinction . . . [was] not tantamount to an

explicit instruction by Congress that 'regarded as' individuals are entitled
to reasonable accommodations., 47 The Eighth Circuit in Weber v.
Strippit,Inc. and the Ninth Circuit in Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas
each found that entitling "regarded as" disabled employees to reasonable

41. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

42. See Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003); Weber v. Strippit,
Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 915-17 (8th Cir. 1999).

43. Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 895 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Jacques
v. DiMarzio, Inc., 2oo F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)).

44. Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 41o F.3d 670, 676 (ioth Cir. 2005).
45. See supra note 33.

46. Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State
Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998).
47. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232; accord Weber, 186 F.3d at 915-17.
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accommodations would lead to "bizarre results." 8 Specifically, the Weber
and Kaplan courts found that a "formalistic reading" of the ADA,
applying plain statutory language to find a duty of reasonable
accommodation in the "regarded as" context, would lead to different
outcomes for similarly situated employees: a healthy employee whose
employer regarded her as disabled would be permitted to demand
unnecessary accommodations, while her similarly healthy co-worker who
was not regarded as disabled would be entitled to no such
accommodations.49 This result would amount to an unjustified "windfall"
for the "regarded as" disabled employee."0
Although the ADA's definition of disability does not on its face
distinguish between "regarded as" and "actually" disabled employees,
the holdings of Weber and Kaplan are not entirely without support from
the text of the ADA. The congressional findings included in the ADA
indicate that it is intended to protect a "discrete and insular minority,"
which "has been subject to a history of purposeful unequal treatment.""
To take Mr. Gelfo as a concrete example, it is not necessarily
immediately obvious how someone whose employer mistakenly believes
him to have a bad back is transformed thereby into a member of a
discrete and insular minority. It is also not immediately obvious from the
text of the ADA what "reasonable accommodation" might mean, when
it is taken as a given in the "regarded as" context that the employee in
fact needs no accommodation at all.
Kaplan in particular provides a stark contrast with the other side of
the split because the facts of the case are so similar in many respects to
the facts that the Third Circuit faced in Williams v. PhiladelphiaHousing
Authority Police Department." In Kaplan, a police officer who had
injured his hand was misdiagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis.53 Based on
the misdiagnosis, the police department fired the officer, believing the
injury to his hand would be permanent and concluding that he could not
perform essential job functions, including using a gun. 4 Kaplan was not
actually permanently disabled; contrary to his employer's expectations,

48. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232; Weber, I86 F.3 d at 916.
49. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232 (citing Weber, i86 F.3d at 917).
50. This approach has been called by many commentators the "windfall doctrine." See, e.g.,
Cheryl L. Anderson, What Is "Because of the Disability" Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct?
Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the Windfall Doctrine,27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323
(2oo6). The term "windfall" comes from dicta in Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 148-

49 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc), that was adopted by the Weber court. See Weber, 186 F.3d at 917.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 121oi(a)(7) (2ooo). I will return to a discussion of the congressional findings in the
ADA in Part IV.
52. 380 F.3d 751, 772-76 (3d Cir. 2004).
53. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1227.

54- Id.
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the officer did recover from his injury.55 He sought relief under the
"regarded as" prong of the ADA's definition of disability but, as
discussed above, the Ninth Circuit rejected his claim. 6
Williams also involved a police officer who was mistakenly regarded
as disabled by his employer. 7 Like Kaplan, Williams too had limitations
due to a medical condition: he had been diagnosed with major
depression, so he could not safely handle firearms. 8 He requested
assignment to the department radio room as an accommodation for this
disability.59 The department refused, suggesting instead that he take
medical leave." When Williams failed to request medical leave, he was
eventually terminated.6' Williams filed suit, claiming violations of the
ADA under both the "actual" and the "regarded as" prongs of the
ADA's definition of disability. 62 The latter claim arose from the
department's refusal to assign him to the radio room. Williams argued
this refusal was based on a misperception of his limitations insofar as the
department regarded Williams not only to be unable to carry a firearm,
but also unable to safely have access to or be around others carrying
firearms despite the analysis of the department's own psychologist to the
contrary. 63 As a result of this misperception, Williams argued, the
department did not regard him as capable of working alternative
assignments, such as being assigned to the radio room.6 4
The Third Circuit, however, took a very different approach to these
facts than the Eighth and the Ninth Circuits would have taken: it
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Williams'
employer on both his actual and regarded as claims.' The Third Circuit
rejected the department's argument that an employee who is not actually
disabled, but onlZ regarded as disabled, is not entitled to any reasonable
accommodation. In so doing, the Williams court not only rejected the
approach of Kaplan and Weber, but also rejected dicta from several
previous Third Circuit opinions cited in Kaplan as persuasive
disagreed with Kaplan's
precedent. 67 The Third Circuit explicitly
conclusion that it would be bizarre for a healthy employee regarded as
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1231.
Id.
Williams, 380 F.3 d at 772-76.
Id. at 757.
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id. at 762-68.
Id. at 766.
Id.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 772-74.
These cases were Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 18o, 196 (3d Cir. 1999) and Deane
v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 149 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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disabled to be entitled to demand reasonable accommodations from her
employer. While acknowledging that "there may be situations in which
applying the reasonable accommodation requirement in favor of a
'regarded as' disabled employee would produce 'bizarre results,'' the
court "perceive[d] no basis for an across-the-board refusal to apply the
ADA in accordance with the plain meaning of its text." 68 The Williams
court also refused to adopt the Kaplan court's interpretation of the
legislative intent behind the ADA: "[Tihe ADA was written to protect
one who is 'disabled' by virtue of being 'regarded as' disabled in the
same way as one who is 'disabled' by virtue of being 'actually disabled,'
69
because being perceived as disabled 'may prove just as disabling."'
Kaplan and Weber do not discuss any United States Supreme Court
precedent relevant to the issue of reasonable accommodations in the
"regarded as" context. Indeed, the high court has never attempted to
construe the ADA disability definition's "regarded as" prong, and only
once has it directly addressed the meaning of "reasonable
accommodations," in a decision that has no direct application to this
circuit split.7" Williams and its progeny, however, have presented a fairly
compelling argument that straightforward application of settled United
States Supreme Court precedent requires the conclusion that there is no
distinction under the ADA between "actual" and "regarded as"
disability claims with respect to the employer's duty to provide
reasonable accommodations. Although the Supreme Court has provided
no guidance on the issue with regard to the ADA, precedent interpreting
the ADA's predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of i973 exists.7' The
Rehabilitation Act's definition of disability is substantially the same as
the ADA's, with both actual and regarded as prongs.72 In Bragdon v.
Abbott, the United States Supreme Court found that the ADA must be
construed "to grant at least as much protection as provided by the
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act. ' 73 In School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline, the high court interpreted the Rehabilitation
Act "to preclude discrimination against '[a] person who has a record of,
or is regarded as having, an impairment [but who] may at present have

68. Williams, 380 F.3d at 774.
69. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. ioi-485 (Ii), at 30 (i99o), as reprinted in 199o U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
453 (legislative history of the ADA)).
70. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393 (2002) (addressing the potential conflict

between ADA reasonable accommodations requirements and employment seniority systems).
7. The ADA's legislative history notes that "[tihe ADA incorporates many of the standards of
discrimination set out in regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
including the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations unless it would result in an undue
hardship on the operation of the business." S. REP. No. soi-s 6, at 2 (1989).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)(i-iii) (2ooo).

73. 524 U.S. 624,631-32 (1998).
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no actual incapacity at all."' 7 4 In Arline, as here, failure to provide
reasonable accommodations was the form of discrimination at issue.75
Williams and its progeny, therefore, conclude that the precedent of
Arline applies to the ADA as well and find that the duty to provide
reasonable
accommodations applies in the "regarded as" disabled
76
context.

There are those who have argued, albeit rather unconvincingly, that
Arline simply does not apply to "regarded as" claims because the narrow
holding of Arline involved the "record of disability" prong, not the
"regarded as" prong of the disability definition.' But neither Kaplan nor
Weber attempted this sort of engagement with precedent: as noted
above, each conceded that the plain language of the statute would lead
them to the opposite conclusion from the one they eventually reach. The
respective courts cited nothing-no congressional findings, no legislative
history, no other materials-to support the notion that Congress meant
anything other than what it said, besides the courts' conclusion that
straightforward application of the plain language of the ADA would lead
to "bizarre" results. 8
74. 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987) (alteration in original) (quoting Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S.

397, 405-06 n.6 (1979))75. Id. at 289 n.I9 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 & app. A, at 315-16 (I985)). See generally 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12102(2), 12 111 (8) (2000).

76. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2004).
77. See Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the Deck? The "Unfair
Advantage" Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 933 n.125 (2000). Travis may

no longer hold this position, however, and properly so: the importance of Arline lies in its treatment of
a plaintiff without an actual disability, not its narrow holding. See Michelle A. Travis, Perceived
Disabilities, Social Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes," 55 VAND. L. REV. 481, 550 (2002) (stating that

Arline was the first interpretation of the "regarded as" prong of the Rehabilitation Act). This apparent
change in Travis's reading of Arline, and argument why her earlier position was wrong, is pointed out
in Nicholas R. Frazier, In the Land Between Two Maps: Perceived Disabilities, Reasonable
Accommodations, and Judicial Battles over the ADA, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1759, 1785 & nn.220-2i
(2005).

78. This point is made in D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1239 (11 th Cir. 2005).
D'Angelo is the case in which the Eleventh Circuit joined the Third in rejecting Weber and Kaplan. Of
course, the doctrine of bizarre results evoked by Weber and Kaplan is a sort of precedent, in its own
right. See Jarad M. Lucan, Note, Applying the Americans with Disabilities Act. Why Giving Traditional
Reasonable Accommodation to "Regarded As" Disabled Individuals Brings About "Bizarre Results,"
25 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 417,444 (2006). Lucan explains:

Even Justice Scalia, arguably the Supreme Court's most fervent strict constructionist, will
"refuse to interpret a statute pursuant to its plain meaning if that meaning would produce
an absurd result." Moreover, Sir William Blackstone, perhaps one of the most prominent
legal minds in history, once proclaimed that "[t]he rule is, where words bear either none, or
a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must deviate a little from the received
sense of them."
Id. (citations omitted). But "bizarre" is in the eye of the beholder. Compare id., with Diaz v. Fed.
Express Corp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1052-53 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ("[T]he mere fact that a statute is
'absurd' does not preclude a finding that it is what the Legislature intended, especially since
Defendant does not seem to have a textual foothold for the proposition that the Legislature [intended
something not expressed by the plain language of the statute]."), and Elizabeth Mills, Comment, How
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This circuit split over the duty to provide reasonable
accommodations in the "regarded as" disabled context, in other words, is
not really an issue of statutory interpretation, nor is it an argument about
the application of ambiguous precedent, even though the dispute has as
its battleground the text of the ADA and judicial interpretation of that
text. Rather, the courts on each side of this split have demonstrated
through their holdings that their fundamental conceptions of what the
ADA is and how it ought to operate are simply incompatible.
Before discussing these differing conceptions of the ADA in more
detail, I will turn to Gelfo and FEHA. As a matter of California law, it
does not matter how or if the United States Supreme Court ultimately
chooses to resolve the circuit split I have discussed in Part I. However,
examination of the reasoning, both explicit and implicit, underlying the
Gelfo court's holding serves as a useful exercise, highlighting the reasons
for the federal circuit split. Those reasons in turn bear upon the
appropriateness of applying federal precedent to the matter of state
disability law at issue in Gelfo.
II.

THE GELFO COURT'S APPLICATION OF FEDERAL PRECEDENT TO

INTERPRETATION OF FEHA
The structure of protections of California disability law under
FEHA is similar in many respects to the ADA's. Like the ADA,
FEHA's definition of disability has three disjunctive prongs: actually
disabled, record or history of disability, and regarded as disabled.79
FEHA similarly requires that an employer provide reasonable
accommodation for the known physical or mental disabilities of an
employee or applicant.S FEHA provides for a separate statutory cause of
action for failure to engage in an interactive process to "determine
reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for
reasonable accommodation by an employee or applicant with a known
physical or mental disability or known medical condition,, 8' which is
analogous to the process mandated by regulations implementing the
ADA's reasonable accommodations requirement. Therefore, in deciding
the issue of first impression before it, the Gelfo court found federal
precedent interpreting the "regarded as" prong of the ADA disability

Bizarre? The Application of Reasonable Accommodation to Employees "Regarded As" Disabled
Underthe ADA Does Not Necessarily Lead to Bizarre Results, 75 Miss. L.J. IO63 (2006).
79. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926(i), (k) (West 2007); see also id. § 12926.I(d)(3).
8o. Id. § I294o(a), (m); Bagatti v. Dep't of Rehab., I18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443,454-55 (Ct. App. 2002).
81. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940(n) (West 2007); see also id. § 12926.i(e); Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 895 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[An employer's duty to accommodate is
inextricably linked to its obligation to engage in a timely, good faith discussion with an applicant or
employee whom it knows is disabled, and who has requested an accommodation, to determine the
extent of the individual's limitations, before an individual may be deemed unable to work.").
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definition to be relevant to its analysis of FEHA's "regarded as" prong."'
Application of federal precedent was somewhat complicated for the
Gelfo court by the fact that the federal circuit courts are split almost
evenly on the issue. Nonetheless, the Gelfo court did not turn to close
analysis of California law as the primary basis for adopting the approach
of one side of the split rather than the other. The court did mention in
passing that the California legislature intended FEHA to provide greater
protection to employees than the ADA and that FEHA be liberally
construed to accomplish its purposes. 8' But by and large the court did not
rely on independent state grounds to substantiate its holding. Instead, the
court's holding is phrased in terms of taking sides in the federal circuit
split:
The legal analysis in Williams [and cases from other circuits following
Williams] is equally applicable in this case. For the reasons stated in
those cases, we conclude the trial court erred in concluding an
employer has no duty, as a matter of law, to provide a reasonable
accommodation to an applicant or employee who is 'regarded as'
disabled under FEHA. 4
The Gelfo court could have noted that the federal courts have fought this
issue to a draw and turned to close analysis of California law. Instead, the
Gelfo court discussed federal law at length, finding Williams and its
8
progeny "better-reasoned" than Kaplan and Weber."
I would argue that the Gelfo court's agreement with Williams and its
progeny is not the result of a coincidental similarity of philosophy
between this panel of the California Court of Appeal and the Third
Circuit. Rather, the Gelfo court's analysis, even when it is explicitly
applying federal precedent, is implicitly shaped by the distinctive features
of California disability law. Williams and its progeny take an approach
that is much more consistent with California law than the Weber and
Kaplan courts, which is why the Gelfo court finds the former to be better
reasoned. To demonstrate this point, I will turn in the next section to
comparison of the differing approaches to disability law represented by
the ADA and FEHA. I will argue that the Gelfo court is absolutely
correct to treat the "regarded as" prong of FEHA the same as the other
prongs of the FEHA disability definition, because that result is most
consistent with California's approach to disability law.
III. COMPARING THE ADA AND FEHA
Despite the similarities noted above, there are fundamental
differences in structure and purpose between California disability law, as
82. Gelfo, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 894.
83. Id. at 892, 894 (citing CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12926.1(a) , (d)(I), 12993(a) (West 2007)).

84. Id. at 894.
85. Id. at 892.
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embodied in FEHA, and the federal approach under the ADA. For
example, the Gelfo court notes that the ADA and FEHA "share the goal
of eliminating discrimination."6 This is true, from a certain perspective;
both Congress and the California legislature included explicit statements
of legislative intent to "eliminate discrimination.""s However, as I will
argue below, the basic understanding of what that phrase means, and
who is to be protected by law against discrimination on the basis of
disability, is very different under the two legislative schemes.
The congressional findings included in the ADA assert that
"individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority" that
have been
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated
to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and
resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute
to, society.This is powerful language, invoking Congress's power to address
violations of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as
described in the United States Supreme Court's famous Footnote 4 of
United States v. Carolene Products Co.s9
But although the congressional findings in the ADA do constitute a
strong statement against discrimination, it must be noted that they
embody an approach to disability law that seeks only to confer
protections on a limited category of individuals, a "discrete and insular
minority." The congressional findings note that it is a large and growing
minority. The first finding listed is the observation that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this
number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older."'
Nonetheless, the implicit corollary to this number is that there are
hundreds of millions of Americans who do not have a disability, and thus
do not come within the primary intended scope of the ADA's
protections. This basic approach of defining a relatively narrow, discrete
class of individuals is continued in the substantive provisions of the Act:

86. Id. at 89i-92.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 121oi(b)(i) (20oo0) ("It is the purpose of this act ... to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities .... "); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12920.5 (West 2007) ("In order to eliminate discrimination, it is
necessary to provide effective remedies that will both prevent and deter unlawful employment
practices and redress the adverse effects of those practices on aggrieved persons.").
88. 42 U.S.C. § 121oi(a)(7) (2ooo).
89. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Congress is explicit that it
intends the ADA as an exercise of its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, in addition to the
commerce clause. 42 U.S.C. § IMsoi(b)(4) (2oo0).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12ioi(a)(I) (2000).
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"No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individualwith a
disability because of the disability... . "9' The ADA does not provide a
blanket prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability. 9 Rather,
it defines a certain "qualified" set of individuals "with a disability" who
are to be afforded protection.
The California legislature has declared a very different approach to
disability law in FEHA:
It is hereby declared as the public policy of this state that it is necessary
to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to
seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or
abridgment on account of race, religious creed, color, national origin,
ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition,

marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation.93
This broad anti-discrimination policy, intended to reach discrimination
against "all persons" on account of disability, among other things, is
echoed in the substantive provisions of FEHA, which prohibit
discrimination against "any person."'94
On its face, this statutory language indicates an approach to
disability law under FEHA that is quite different from that of the ADA.
Like the ADA, FEHA too is intended to protect the civil rights of
individuals with a disability, among other things. Indeed, disability is
explicitly included as a protected category in California's primary civil
rights law, the Unruh Civil Rights Act.95 The definition of disability is
identical in FEHA and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. 96 The current version
of the definition was added to both statutes by the same legislative
enactment, the Prudence Kay Poppink Act. 9 Moreover, the legislature
has explicitly directed that the "opportunity to seek, obtain and hold
91. Id. § 12H12(a) (emphasis added).
92. Compare with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer... to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .
I..."
Id. § 2oooe-2 (2000).
93. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 2007) (emphasis added).
94. Id. § 12940(a).
95. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2007) ("All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free
and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability,
medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every
kind whatsoever." (emphasis added)).
96. See id. § 51(e).
97. 2000 Cal. Stat. 5812. Prudence Kay Poppink, incidentally, was a lawyer, a graduate of
Hastings College of the Law, who specialized in employment and housing law for decades, working at
the California Fair Employment and Housing Commission, including as the Commission's regulations
coordinator. She also drafted some of the language that was eventually adopted into FEHA. In 2000,
she was forced to retire for health reasons, and the bill, which was already working its way through the
legislature, was named in her honor. See State Bar of California, http://www.calbar.ca.gov (enter
"Poppink" into "Search Calbar Site"; then follow hyperlink "Public Lawyer of the Year 2000") (last
visited Nov. 22, 2007).
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employment without discrimination because of... physical disability,
mental disability, [or] medical condition... is hereby recognized as and
declared to be a civil right." But California's Legislature does not
appear to have been working under the "discrete and insular minority"
model of civil rights invoked by Congress with regard to the ADA.
Rather, disability rights are described as inhering in "all persons,"
whether disabled or not: every person in California has the right to
"seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination or
abridgment on account of" disability.'
This is not to say that under California law all employer
discrimination on the basis of disability is forbidden. Where the
discrimination is justified because the employee is "unable to perform his
or her essential duties even with reasonable accommodations, or cannot
perform those duties in a manner that would not endanger his or her
health or safety or the health or safety of others even with reasonable
accommodations," an employer will not be held liable under FEHA.'"
Thus, the end effect of the FEHA statutory scheme, like the ADA, is to
delineate a finite group of people-people who are disabled, within the
meaning of the respective statutes and who have been subjected to
impermissible discrimination by their employers on the basis of that
disability. Under both California and federal law, only those who fall
within that finite group will have a legal claim against their employer.
Even if FEHA and the ADA reach the same end point,"' however,
they do so from different directions: where the ADA begins with the
goal of protecting a discrete and insular minority, FEHA begins by
forbidding all discrimination on the basis of disability and then providing
exceptions for certain circumstances where the employer action is
justified. Even if the two statutory schemes have similar end results on
some issues, on other issues the difference in approach leads to very
different results. In the next section, I will return to the "regarded as"
disabled issue, with attention to the effect of these different approaches
on the analysis.
IV.

RETURNING TO THE "REGARDED AS" ISSUE

The different approaches to disability law embodied by FEHA and
the ADA need not necessarily lead to different results on the issue of an
employer's duty to provide reasonable accommodations and engage in
the interactive process to determine reasonable accommodations in the
98.

CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12921

(West 2007).

99. Id. § 12920.

ioo. Id. § 1294o(a)(i).
to. At least the end point is analogous. As noted above, FEHA's substantive protections for
employees are significantly broader than the ADA's. There will be many plaintiffs, therefore, who
have a claim under FEHA but do not fall within the protections of the ADA.
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"regarded as" disabled context. As noted above, under the plain
language of the ADA, an employee who is regarded as disabled by his or
her employer is entitled to the same protections as an employee who is
actually disabled. From this perspective, the "regarded as" disabled
employee simply is an "individual with a disability" under the plain
language of the statute; that is, someone who is a member of the finite
class of individuals intended to come under the ADA's protections. The
same result is reached from a different direction by following the plain
language of FEHA. Nothing in the statutory language would except an
employer in the "regarded as" context from the general rule of liability
for discrimination on account of disability; indeed, there is explicit
direction that FEHA is intended "to provide protection when an
individual is erroneously or mistakenly believed to have any physical or
mental condition that limits a major life activity."'..
Examination of the different approaches of California and federal
disability law does shed some light, however, on why such a dramatic
circuit split has arisen in the federal courts on the issue, but not in
California. Some of the federal circuits have perceived a tension between
the substantive provisions of the ADA, which appear to extend
protections to the "regarded as" disabled individual, and Congress's
express findings and purposes. The court in Kaplan, for example, noted
that the ADA is intended to decrease "'stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of [people with disabilities].".. 3 The
court continued:
Dispelling stereotypes about disabilities will often come from the
employees themselves as they demonstrate their capacity to be
productive members of the workplace notwithstanding impairments.
Were we to entitle 'regarded as' employees to reasonable
accommodation, it would do nothing to encourage those employees to
educate employers of their capabilities, and do nothing to encourage
the employers to see their employees' talents clearly.' 4
The Kaplan court also found that "[t]o require accommodation for those
not truly disabled would compel employers to waste resources
unnecessarily, when the employers' limited resources would be better
spent assisting those persons who are actually disabled and in genuine
need of accommodation to perform to their potential."' 5 Thus, despite
the plain language of the statute, the Kaplan court refused to find any
duty to accommodate a "regarded as" disabled employee.' °6

102. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12 9 26.1(d)(3) (West 2007); see also id. § 12926(i), (k).
103. Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003)

§ 12101(a)(7) (2000)).
104. Id.

105. Id.
106. Id.

(quoting

42 U.S.C.
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There are, of course, responses to the points the Kaplan court
makes. The court misses the main point of applying the duty of
reasonable accommodation and the associated informal interactive
process in the "regarded as" context, giving the employer an opportunity
to realize that the employee is not in fact disabled and should not be
regarded as such.' ° The argument that employees would have an
incentive to do nothing to educate their employers of their true
capabilities simply ignores the duty on the part of both employer and
employee to engage in an interactive process to determine what would
constitute reasonable accommodations.' An employee who deliberately
allowed an employer to continue in a mistaken belief that the employee
was disabled would almost certainly be found to have acted in bad faith,
and the employer would not be held liable."° If an employer stubbornly
insists on regarding the employee as disabled, despite the employee's
good faith effort to disabuse the employer of that notion, any
"unnecessary" accommodations that may be required because of that
mistaken belief would seem to be the employer's fault, not the
employee's.
However, even though Weber and Kaplan's arguments are refutable,
it cannot be said that their holdings are entirely without basis. That is to
say, the court in Kaplan was not entirely without reason for looking at
the plaintiff before it and concluding that, based on the express purposes
of the ADA, Congress could not have meant to reach this set of facts.
Kaplan was a police officer whose only "disability" was that his employer
incorrectly believed him to have arthritis in his hand."' How is such a
person a member of a "discrete and insular minority" that has been
subjected to a history of discrimination? Again, the comparison with
Williams is important, here not for the similarity but for the difference in
the facts. In both cases the plaintiffs were police officers who were fired
because their respective disabilities meant, among other things, that
neither could safely use a gun. Williams, however, in fact suffered from
serious depression."' While Kaplan actually could use a gun, although his
employer believed otherwise, Williams could not safely do so. Williams's
claim was in part based on the argument that although he could not carry
a weapon safely, there was no danger in letting him be around others
who were armed, as would be the case if he were assigned to the radio

107. See Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 4io F.3d 67o, 676 (ioth Cir. 2005); see also supra text
accompanying note 44.
io8. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d t105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000); see also supra text
accompanying note 39.
lO9. See, e.g., Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 168-71 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
Io. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1228.
i i i. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 38o F.3d 751, 756-57 (3d Cir. 2004).
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room of the department as an accommodation for his disability.' 2
Williams therefore had an easier set of facts than Kaplan for making the
case that his employer's action was based on "stereotypic assumptions"
about the "discrete and insular minority" of people with his particular
disability.
As discussed above, in contrast to the federal approach, extending
protections to the "discrete and insular minority" of "individuals with a
disability," FEHA sets up a general rule applying the protections of
FEHA to "all persons" unless there is some applicable exception that
would excuse employer discrimination. There is no exception excusing
employer discrimination against a person who is regarded as, but not
actually disabled. There is thus no tension between the substantive
provisions of FEHA and the express statements of legislative intent on
this issue. Without ever looking to federal precedent, therefore, it is clear
that employers owe "regarded as" disabled plaintiffs a duty of reasonable
accommodation and must participate in an interactive process to
determine those reasonable accommodations under California law.
Although the Gelfo court primarily relied on analysis of federal law, its
holding was fully consistent with California disability law. It is, I would
propose, because the Gelfo court examined the federal circuit split with a
perspective informed by California's approach to disability law, as much
as any flaws in the reasoning of Kaplan and Weber, that the Gelfo court
found Williams and its progeny "better-reasoned."
In sum, the issue of an employer's duty (or lack thereof) to
reasonably accommodate employees who are regarded as disabled, but
not actually disabled, is one about which reasonable minds perhaps can
disagree on the federal level because of the tension some courts have
found between Congress's express findings and statements of purpose
and the substantive provisions of the ADA."3 There is no such tension to
be found, however, in FEHA. Therefore, when the Gelfo court
reflexively turned to federal law for guidance on this matter of first
impression for California law, it unnecessarily complicated the analysis.
This complication did not lead the Gelfo court into error because it sided
with the federal circuits whose holdings were most consistent with
California disability law, either because those circuits' holdings are in
fact "better-reasoned," as the Gelfo court put it, or because California's
approach to disability law implicitly informed the court's decision to
152. Id. at 766.
113. That said, I do find Williams and its progeny much more persuasive, insofar as those courts
give effect to the plain language of the ADA. If Congress meant something other than what it said in
the substantive provisions of the ADA, it should amend the ADA to make itself clear. Also, although
there may be some circumstances in which applying a duty of reasonable accommodation in the
"regarded as" context would lead to bizarre results, I am not convinced that the factual situations of
Weber or Kaplan constitute such circumstances.
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agree with one side of the federal split over the other.
In other circumstances, however, the analytic move on the part of
California appellate courts to apply federal precedent to interpret
California disability law has not been as benign as in Gelfo. In the next
section, I will turn to an issue that is in a sense the inverse of the
"regarded as" issue I have discussed so far, in that it involves an issue
that is settled as a matter of federal law, but until recently had split the
California appellate courts.
V.

APPLICATION OF

ADA

PRECEDENT TO CONSTRUE

FEHA

CAN LEAD TO ERROR

As noted above, Gelfo involved a matter of first impression in
California. No other California appellate court has addressed the issue of
reasonable accommodations in the "regarded as" context, so there has
been no opportunity for disagreement. Moreover, a future split in the
California appellate courts on this particular issue is unlikely because the
legislature has stated explicitly that FEHA protections are intended to
extend to those who are regarded as, but not actually disabled. The Gelfo
court's method of analysis, however, of turning reflexively to federal
precedent as a guide to interpreting California disability law, represents a
potentially problematic precedent. There is a risk that reflexive
application of federal precedent will lead to error by courts faced with
other California disability law issues if those courts fail to pay heed to the
significant differences between the ADA and FEHA. Unfortunately, the
California Supreme Court recently demonstrated that it is prone to
precisely that analytic deficiency.
In Green v. State, the California Supreme Court addressed a
question of statutory interpretation of FEHA that had split the courts of
appeal."4 At issue in Green was what a plaintiff must prove to support a
claim of employment discrimination on account of disability under
FEHA."5 California courts have sometimes applied the federal
"McDonnell Douglas test," a three-stage burden shifting test designed
for use in evaluating disability claims under the ADA. " ' In the first stage,
I14. I65 P.3d 1i8 (Cal. 2007).
itS. Id.
at 121.

116. E.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d IO89, H13 (Cal. 2000). See generally McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4I1 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). One could question whether California should apply
the McDonnell Douglas test: in addition to the McDonnell Douglas test, there are two other standards
for evaluating discrimination claims in circulation in the federal courts and a complicated muddle of
circuit splits about which one to use in which circumstances. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d
838, 851-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that this area of law has been referred to as "a quagmire," a
"morass," and "chaos"), affd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). There are at least some, however, who consider
McDonnell Douglas the least plaintiff-friendly of the three, if not in theory than at least in practice.
See William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2oo3: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. &
Emp. L. 199, 200 (2003). Another note could be written, in the same spirit as this one, arguing that to
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the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of liability on the part of
the employer: if the plaintiff cannot do so, the employer is entitled to
summary judgment without presenting any further evidence." 7 If the
employee meets this burden, the second stage of the test requires the
employer to produce sufficient evidence to shift the burden back to the
employee." 8 In the third stage, the employee must not only produce
evidence of discrimination, but must prove discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence."9
When the McDonnell Douglas test is applied in federal cases under
the ADA, the employee's prima facie showing in the first stage of the
test must include evidence that the employee is a "qualified individual"
in the meaning of the statute, that is, that he or she has the capacity to
perform a job's essential duties "with or without reasonable
accommodation."' 0 Several California courts of appeal, including the
court in Brundage v. Hahn,'2' have presumed without analysis that the
same standard applies when the McDonnell Douglas test is employed in
FEHA disability cases, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate in their prima
facie case that "(i) plaintiff suffers from a disability; (2) plaintiff is a
qualified individual; and (3) plaintiff was subjected to an adverse
employment action because of the disability."',2
The California Court of Appeal in Green, however, refused to follow
the presumption of Brundage and its progeny, holding that a plaintiff
need only establish that "(i) plaintiff is a person with a disability or
medical condition, and (2) the defendant made an adverse employment
23
decision (3)because of plaintiff's disability or medical condition.'
Under this interpretation, once the plaintiff makes this prima facie
showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish as an affirmative
defense that plaintiff's physical disability renders him unable to perform

adopt the least plaintiff-friendly of the three federal tests is inconsistent with the explicit legislative
intent underlying FEHA. However, California courts are comfortable with applying three-stage
burden shifting tests from the summary judgment context. See Aguilar v. Ati. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d
493, 510 (Cal. 2001). Moreover, whether McDonnell Douglas is an inappropriate burden on plaintiffs
under California law depends largely on what constitutes a sufficient prima facie case, and this is
where the split among the appellate districts has arisen.
117. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
II8. Id.
119. Id.
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000); Morisky v. Broward County, 8o F.3d 445, 447 (11th Cir.
1996).
121. 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830 (Ct. App. 1997).
122. Id. at 835; accord Hastings v. Dep't of Corr., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 329, 334 (Ct. App. 2003); Finegan
v. County of Los Angeles, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 767 (Ct. App. 2001); Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1o2
Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 61 (Ct. App. 2000); Quinn v. City of Los Angeles, ioo Cal. Rptr. 2d 914, 915 (C.
App. 2000); Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co., go Cal. Rptr. 2d 15,21 (Ct. App. 1999).
123. Green v. State, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 254, 262 (Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 165 P.3 d I8 (Cal. 2007).
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the job's essential duties.'24
The statutory language of FEHA does not resolve the dispute
between the courts of appeal in Brundage and Green; the burden of
proof regarding the employee's qualifications is not explicitly allocated
either to the plaintiff or the defendant in the text of the statute. To
resolve the disagreement between the appellate districts, the California
Supreme Court granted review of Green.'25 A bare four to three majority
found, over a vigorous dissent, that the Brundage court was correct,
concluding that "the Legislature has placed the burden on the plaintiff to
show that he or she is a qualified individual under the FEHA (i.e., that
he or she can perform the essential functions of the job with or without
reasonable accommodation). ' ' 26 Thus, in the opinion of the majority, the
ADA and FEHA are to be interpreted identically on the issue of
employee qualifications, and ADA precedent that places the burden of
proving qualifications on the employee may be applied to state disability
discrimination claims under FEHA.
The opinion of the majority of the California Supreme Court in
Green is marred by remarkably poor reasoning. As the dissent points
out: "IT]he majority ignores the statute's structure, distorts its legislative
and regulatory history, and relies on inapposite authority.' ' . 7 The
majority opinion relies heavily on the premise that under FEHA an
employer is not liable for discriminating on the basis of disability against
an employee who is not qualified to perform the job. , 8 The majority
concludes from this premise that the plaintiff employee bears the burden
of proving he or she was able to do the job, with or without reasonable
accommodation.'29 This reasoning does not hold water: no party
advocated that employers should be liable under FEHA for
discriminating against the unqualified. The issue before the Court was
whether plaintiffs should be forced to prove their qualifications as part of
their prima facie case, or whether employers must raise plaintiffs' lack of
qualifications as an affirmative defense.'30 Either way, unqualified
employees would not be entitled to relief under FEHA. This fallacious
reasoning by the majority
is characterized by the dissent as the majority's
3
"fundamental" error.' 1
I agree with each of the dissent's individual criticisms of the majority
opinion, although I will not discuss each of those criticisms in detail here.

124. Id.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Green, I65 P.3d II8, 121 (Cal. 2007).
Id.
Id. at 126 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
Id.

Id.
See id.
Id.
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I would quibble only with the dissent's identification of the majority's
"fundamental" error. Certainly, the error of logic the dissent identifies
does "pervade" the majority's discussion, but I would suggest that the
majority's weak logic is in turn motivated by an erroneous assumption
that is even more fundamental: ADA precedent is to be presumed
relevant to interpreting FEHA. The California Supreme Court had
previously stated in Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. that "[blecause of the
similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws,
California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our
own statutes.' 32 In Green, the majority in essence reads the word
"pertinent" out of that statement, focusing blindly on the similarities
between the two statutes and making no attempt to discern any pertinent
asserts that the ADA and FEHA are
differences. The majority
"strikingly similar"'33 and the rest of the opinion is filtered through the
distorting prism of that notion.
The damage of Green's holding may extend beyond simply the
narrow holding of the case, which may result in reversal of the judgment
Green had previously won against his employer.'34 More importantly
than the result for any particular plaintiff, or even the allocation of the
burden of proof regarding employee qualifications, the majority in Green
has once again affirmed an approach to interpreting California disability
law that mechanically applies federal precedent, without any serious
consideration that California disability law may be materially different.
The majority's opinion is, among other things, a remarkable collection of
string cites to federal authority regarding the ADA, interrupted only
occasionally by reference to California precedent.'35 It is significant that
when the Gelfo court sought support for the notion that "state law will
part ways with federal law in order to advance the legislative goal of
providing greater protection to employees than the ADA," it did not cite
a California Supreme Court case, but rather a federal district court
opinion applying California law."36 There simply has not been a clear
mandate from California's highest court that this extra level of analysis is
necessary.'37 Indeed, out of context, the pithy rule from Guz that

132. 8 P.3d io89, 1113 (Cal. 2000).

133. Green, 165 P.3d at 123.
134. The majority's disposition of the case was to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal

affirming the jury's judgment against Green's employer, the State of California. Technically, the
Supreme Court only "remand[ed] the matter for proceedings consistent with this decision." Id. at 126.
It is possible that on remand the Court of Appeal would find any error at trial harmless, even in light
of the Supreme Court's decision, but it is likely that it will remand to the Superior Court for retrial.
135. See id. at 122.

136. Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 878 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Diaz v. Fed.
Express Corp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1053-54 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).
137. Remarkably, before Green, California Government Code section 12926.1(a), which states that

FEHA is intended to provide "protections independent from those in the [ADA]" and that
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"California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our
own statutes" almost implies the contrary, as does the Green majority's
observation about the "striking similarities" between FEHA and the
ADA.
Thus, the California Supreme Court was presented with, but missed,
an important opportunity. It could have done more than just affirm the
Green Court of Appeal's refusal to apply an inappropriate federal
standard on the issue of what prima facie showing a plaintiff must make
on a disability claim. It could also have stated clearly and with the
authority of the state's highest court that although pertinent federal
precedent may have some persuasive value, it must always be evaluated
in the light of the significantly different approach to disability law
mandated by the California legislature. It is perhaps some comfort that
three justices were ready to take that opportunity, and perhaps in the
future will be able to garner another vote. For the moment, however, the
ball is (again) in the Legislature's court.'3
CONCLUSION

Although the court in Gelfo addressed a matter of first impression
under California law, and took sides on an issue that has split the federal
circuits, the importance of the case is not so much its narrow holding, but
rather its method of analysis. Although the Gelfo court came to the right
result, similar methods have led astray other California appellate courts,
including the California Supreme Court, on other state disability law
questions. As demonstrated by the federal and state appellate court splits
examined here, it would seem a useful exercise for both the federal and
the state courts to conduct a more thorough examination of the
fundamental approaches to disability law that underlie their analyses.
Both levels of government can thereby thoughtfully address the question
of whether their respective disability laws are functioning as intended.

"[allthough the [ADA] provides a floor of protection, this state's law has always, even prior to passage
of the [ADA], afforded additional protections," had never been cited by the California Supreme
Court. And the majority in Green cited it only to dismiss it as irrelevant. 165 P.3d at 125.
138. The California Legislature has not been shy about overruling decisions of the California
judicial branch regarding FEHA. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926. 1 (d) (West 2007) (superseding Cassista
v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 5143 (Cal. 1993)); id. § 12941 (rejecting Marks v. Loral Corp., 68 Cal.
Rptr. 2d I (Ct. App. 1997)).
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